The Supply-Side Effects of Targeted Financial Aid: Evidence from Colombia
Job Market Paper
Governments usually implement restrictions on where financial aid can be used to induce sorting into programs with higher expected returns. But these restrictions also have implications for supply-side responses. Using an equilibrium model of competition in higher education, we study how restricting where aid can be redeemed shapes private colleges’ price and quality responses in the context of Colombia’s Ser Pilo Paga (SPP), a forgivable loan program that covered the full tuition of high-scoring, low-income students, but only at the 12% of colleges with a “high quality” certification. Aid recipients pay little out of pocket, and the restriction makes them concentrate in programs at certified colleges, which therefore face less price-elastic demand and earn higher margins. Recipients still care about quality when choosing among these programs, so the higher margins raise the return to improving it. SPP raises the quality (earnings value-added) received by aid-eligible students by 95% and the sticker price they choose by 65%, and supply responses account for about half of these increases. Under a counterfactual policy where the same students could use the aid at any private program, aid-eligible students would attend programs of 30% lower quality and 17% lower sticker price relative to SPP, because of both different sorting and smaller supply responses. Overall, the gain in an entering cohort’s earnings is about 45% larger under SPP than under the counterfactual, while the increase in tuition spending is only 18% larger.